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Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell:
Laugh or Cry, Public Figures Must Learn
to Live with Satirical Criticism
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency over the last several years, plaintiffs su-
ing media defendants for defamation have also asserted claims for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress.' In an effort to preserve
the media's first amendment protection in defamation2 suits, the
Supreme Court enunciated the "actual malice" standard in its 1964
decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 This standard pre-
cludes a public figure or public official from recovering against a me-
dia defendant for defamation unless he proves that the defendant
made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless dis-
regard for the truth.4
A problem arises when a public figure attempts to circumvent the
rigorous "actual malice" standard by characterizing his claim as one
for intentional infliction of emotional distress allegedly resulting
from the same publication on which the defamation claim is based. In
essence, such a plaintiff is attempting to recover for the same alleged
1. See generally Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method
Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 36-37 (1983). In addition to in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, other theories of liability have been pled in
conjunction with defamation. In particular, invasion of privacy claims are often raised.
For examples see Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (alleging
libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1132 (1983) and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (alleging defama-
tion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy).
2. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following elements for
defamation:
(a) [A] false and defamatory statement concerning another (the plaintiff);
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1965).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 279-80. The Supreme Court has previously utilized the "actual malice"
standard for causes of action other than defamation. In 1967, the Court held that a
plaintiff who brings a "false light" invasion of privacy suit for the publication of a mat-
ter of public interest must establish "actual malice" as a condition precedent to recov-
ery. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967).
wrong, under a different theory, without having to negotiate the sub-
stantial first amendment hurdles that the Supreme Court has care-
fully put in place.5
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,6 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether the first amendment places any lim-
its on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial
court awarded damages to Reverend Jerry Falwell for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress against Hustler Magazine and Larry
Flynt. The award was based solely on a finding that the defendants
intended to cause Falwell emotional distress by publishing a distaste-
ful ad parody about him.7 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the decision and held that a public figure cannot recover for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress caused by the publication of a
satirical work, without first proving "actual malice."8 The opinion of
the Court, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, demonstrated its com-
mitment to the preservation of free speech and the continued utility
of the New York Times standard to meet this end.9
This note begins by providing a historical overview of both defama-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Next, the proce-
dural and factual history of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell will be
traced from the trial court to the United States Supreme Court. Ad-
ditionally, the majority and concurring opinions will be analyzed. Fi-
nally, this note will conclude with an examination of the impact that
the Falwell holding will have on public figures, the media, and free
speech.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Development of the Law of Defamation
Prior to 1964, the common law tort of defamation had been un-
restricted by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.10
5. Such an "end run" could result in liability for speech protected by the first
amendment and possibly promote the media self-censorship that the "actual malice"
standard was intended to prevent. See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270-72.
6. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
7. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
8. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
9. There was speculation that the Court had grown disenchanted with the New
York Times standard after its decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing punitive damages for defamation about actual
malice viewed as not violating first amendment). See Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: Does the Actual Malice Standard of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. Apply to Speech on Matters of Purely Private Concern?, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
337, 353-54 (1987). The Falwell decision indicates that the New York Times standard is
still appropriate in disputes involving public figures and media defendants. See
Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
10. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 3-4 (1980). This fact is evi-
denced by the Supreme Court's reference to defamatory statements as falling within
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However, in 1964 the United States Supreme Court began to define
the constitutional parameters of defamation in the landmark decision
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." In New York Times, the Court
held that the first amendment "prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."'12 Accordingly, the burden
carried by public officials in maintaining a defamation action against
a media defendant substantially increased.
The Supreme Court justified its creation of the actual malice re-
quirement by asserting its "commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleas-
antly sharp attacks on government and public officials."13 Further-
more, the Court recognized the inevitability that erroneous
statements would be made in such open debate and maintained that
even these statements must receive protection in order to preserve a
healthy climate of free expression for all speech.
The application of the actual malice standard exclusively to public
one of the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the plaintiff, one of three elected
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit against the New
York Times Company, claiming that he had been defamed by statements made in a
full-page advertisement which the company had printed. The advertisement was an
appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the black student civil rights move-
ment, the struggle for the right to vote, and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.
The ad stated that "[t]hey have bombed [Dr. King's] home almost killing his wife
and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times .... "
The plaintiff contended that the pronoun "they" in the phrase "they have arrested
him seven times" would be read as referring to the police and thus to him because he
was the municipal authority who supervised the police department. Further, the
plaintiff claimed that the text implied that the police performed the other described
acts. The plaintiff and six other witnesses testified that they had interpreted the ad-
vertisement as referring to the plaintiff in his official capacity. Also, it was ascertained
that the ad contained several factual errors.
The judge instructed the jury that the statements were libel per se and not privi-
leged. Therefore, if the jury determined that the newspaper published the advertise-
ment and that the statements were about the plaintiff, then the newspaper would be
held liable. Id. at 256-59, 262.
12. Id at 279-80.
13. Id. at 270.
officials 14 was short-lived, however, as the Supreme Court, in Curtis
Publication Co. v. Butts,15 extended the requirement to defamation
suits brought by public figures against media defendants. In his con-
curring opinion, Chief Justice Warren contended that the distinction
between "public figures" and "public officials" had become blurred.
He reasoned that requiring different standards of proof had "no basis
in law, logic, or First Amendment policy."16
In the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,17 the
Supreme Court specifically rejected the public figure/official require-
ment and held that actual malice must be proven where the speech
involved "an event of public or general concern."' 8 The Court as-
serted that the plaintiff's status as a private person is irrelevant in
determining whether the issue is one of public interest. I '
The Rosenbloom holding did not enjoy much longevity, however, as
three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,20 the Supreme Court
returned to the view that only public officials or public figures fell
within the purview of the New York Times rule.21 In Gertz, the
14. Shortly after the New York Times decision, the Court ruled that the actual
malice standard was to be applied in state criminal libel prosecutions resulting from
statements critical of the official conduct of public officers. See Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964). The Court maintained that the "larger public interest" in dissemi-
nation of the truth outweighed the public official's interest in his private reputation.
Id. at 72-73. Additionally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the Court held that
the term "public official" includes not only individuals elected to office but also those
government employees who were in positions of "substantial responsibility for or con-
trol over the conduct of government affairs." Id. at 85.
15. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Butts, the plaintiff, who was a well-known college foot-
ball coach, brought a libel action against the Saturday Evening Post for the publication
of an article that accused him of conspiring to "fix" a football game. The football
coach was held to be a public figure and thus had to prove that the article had been
published with actual malice. Id. at 134-36, 155.
16. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren asserted that the
blurred distinction between "public figures" and "public officials" might be the result
of:
a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of science, industry,
and government, and a high degree of interaction between the intellectual,
governmental, and business worlds. Depression, war, international tensions,
national and international markets, and the surging growth of science and
technology have precipitated national and international problems that de-
mand national and international solutions. While these trends and events
have occasioned a consolidation of governmental power, power has also be-
come much more organized in what we have commonly considered to be the
private sector.
Id.
17. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (suit against radio station for broadcasting news stories that
described plaintiff as a "girlie-book peddler" and charged him with being involved in
the "smut literature racket").
18. Id. at 52.
19. Id. at 43-44.
20. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Defendant, a magazine publisher, alleged that the plain-
tiff, a Chicago attorney, was part of a conspiracy to discredit the local police and that
he was a "Communist-fronter." Id. at 325-26.
21. Id. at 346-47.
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Court articulated the interests involved: "[t]he need to avoid self-cen-
sorship by the news media"2 2 and "the compensation of individuals
for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."23 Justice
Powell stated that the public or general interest standard of Rosen-
bloom was insufficient to serve these competing interests. 24 More-
over, the Court viewed the state as having a greater interest in
protecting private individuals from defamatory falsehoods than in
protecting public persons.2 5 This belief is premised upon the idea
that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to a heightened risk of injury from defamatory state-
ments concerning them.26 Additionally, public figures and public of-
ficials generally have superior access to the media and thus are more
able than private plaintiffs to rebut false statements made about
them.27
Finally, the Gertz Court held that statements of opinion were enti-
tled to full first amendment protection. 28 This is true regardless of
how damaging the opinion is to the plaintiff's reputation. The Court
mandated that "under the First Amendment there is no such thing as
a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but upon
the competition of other ideas." 29
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[o]ne who by ex-
treme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes se-
22. Id. at 341.
23. Id.
24. Id at 343, 346.
25. Id at 345.
26. Id. at 344. For an interesting discussion of celebrities as public figures, see R.
SACK, supra note 10, at 229-30.
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. In fact, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he first remedy of
any victim of defamation is self-help--using available opportunities to contradict the
lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation." Id
In Rosenbloom, Justice Harlan also acknowledged that public figures and officials can
obtain avenues of communication with less difficulty than private persons. Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. For a discussion of constitutional protection of
opinion, see R. SACK, supra note 10, at 176-80. For an informative explanation of the
distinction between statements of opinion and fact, see ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUG-
LAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 203-06 (1966).
29. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. However, the Court observed that false statements of
fact, whether made accidentally or intentionally, are of no value in public debate. Id.
at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
vere emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress."3 0 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is designed to protect one's interest in emotional tranquil-
ity.3 ' However, due to the difficulty in assessing injury and the like-
lihood of feigned claims, intentionally inflicted emotional distress has
been recognized only recently as a separately maintainable action.32
At present, most jurisdictions, including Virginia where Falwell v.
Flynt33 was tried, have adopted the formulation of the tort found in
the Restatement (Second).3 4 Under this view, intentional infliction
of emotional distress is established by proving four elements:
1) The defendant's conduct was intentional3 5 or reckless;3 6
2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous;
3) the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress; and
4) the emotional distress was severe.3 7
Certainly, the most crucial element is the extreme and outrageous
conduct because proof of the other elements may be inferred from
the outrageous conduct.38 The comments to the Restatement (Sec-
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
31. See Givelbar, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Irifliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 42, 51 (1982); see also Mead, supra note 1, at 27.
32. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 at 49-50 (4th ed. 1971); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Initially, recovery for emotional
distress was allowed only as a by-product of an independent tort, such as battery or
false imprisonment. See W. PROSSER, supra, § 12, at 49-50; see also Mead, supra note 1,
at 28. However, it is suggested that where no bodily harm (i.e. shock or illness) results
from severe emotional distress, the gravity of the act's outrageousness may serve to
establish that the claim is valid or not trivial. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment k (1965).
33. 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 38,
210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct.
876 (1988).
34. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress as Independent Tort" "outrage", 38 A.L.R. 4th 998 (1985).
35. Intent may be established by showing that the defendant desires to inflict se-
vere emotional distress upon the plaintiff or knows with substantial certainty that his
actions will cause such distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i
(1965).
36. To prove reckless disregard, one must show that the defendant had a subjec-
tive awareness of a high probability that severe emotional distress would be inflicted
and yet proceeded in "conscious disregard" of that high probability. See, e.g., Plocar v.
Dunkin Donuts of America, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 740, 746, 431 N.E.2d 1175, 1179-80
(1981). For example, intent through recklessness was found when the defendant chose
to commit suicide by slashing his throat in the plaintiff's kitchen. Upon her return
home, the plaintiff found his corpse with blood all over the premises. Blakeley v.
Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 792, 20 N.W.2d 28, 31 (1945).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
38. See, e.g., Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C.) (indicating
that one may infer the existence of the element of intent or recklessness from the out-
rageousness of defendant's conduct), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 912 (1982); Poulsen v. Rus-
sel, 300 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Iowa 1981) (plaintiff unable to establish the element of severe
and extreme emotional distress); Bennet v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393,
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ond) indicate:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
The liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoy-
ances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.... There must still be freedom
to express an unflattering opinion.
3 9
While the Restatement (Second) attempts to define the parameters
of what is outrageous and what is not, inevitably the determination of
outrageousness will be in large part a subjective one.40 Consequently,
where potential liability for expression exists, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress takes on constitutional dimensions.
As a result of the stringent standard set forth in New York Times,
emotional distress claims against the media, either alone or in con-
junction with defamation claims, have increased dramatically in re-
cent years.41 However, until the decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, the first amendment implications on the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress had never been addressed by the
Supreme Court.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jerry Falwell, a well-known minister and commentator on political
and public issues, filed suit in federal district court against defend-
ants Larry Flynt, Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and Flynt Distrib-
uting Company for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The damage to Falwell allegedly re-
398 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that expert medical testimony unnecessary to show
causation between plaintiff's harm and defendant's act).
However, some courts have held that proof of extreme and outrageous conduct along
with the plaintiff's testimony of mental suffering are not sufficient to establish severe
emotional distress. See, e.g., Venerias v. Johnson, 127 Ariz. 496, 500, 622 P.2d 55, 59 (Ct.
App. 1980) (dismissing complaint when plaintiff's sole evidence of his severe emotional
distress was his own testimony); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 570-71, 380 A.2d 611, 616-
17 (1977) (decision regarding outrageous conduct unnecessary because plaintiff failed
to establish that he suffered severe emotional distress).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
40. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text. One commentator has observed
the following with respect to the vague nature of outrageousness: "The term 'outra-
geous' is neither value-free nor exacting. It does not objectively describe an act or se-
ries of acts; rather, it represents an evaluation of behavior. The concept thus fails to
provide clear guidance either to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to
those who must evaluate that conduct." Givelbar, supra note 31, at 51.
41. See Mead, supra note 1, at 28, 33-39.
sulted from the publication of an ad parody in Hustler magazine. 42
The ad parody attempted to satirize an actual promotional campaign
for Campari Liqueur in which celebrities discuss their "first time."
Ostensibly, the celebrities are referring to their first experience with
the liqueur; however, the sexual double entendre is evident through-
out the advertisements.43 The ad parody for which Falwell brought
suit portrays Falwell as the celebrity subject who describes his "first
time" as a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an out-
house.44 Falwell's mother is presented as a drunken and promiscu-
ous woman, and Falwell is depicted as a hypocritical drunkard.45
At trial, the district court granted a directed verdict against plain-
tiff Falwell for his invasion of privacy claim.46 Moreover, the jury
found against Falwell on the libel claim, reasoning that no reasonable
person would believe that the parody was reporting actual facts about
him.47 However, the jury returned a verdict for Falwell on his emo-
tional distress claim,48 awarding him $100,000 in actual damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages against both Flynt and Hustler.49
42. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). The ad parody was first published in
the November 1983 issue of Hustler and then again in the March 1984 issue after
Falwell had initiated his suit. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The parody is referred to in the table of contents as "Fiction: Ad and Per-
sonality Parody"; and at the bottom of the ad parody itself a disclaimer reads "ad par-
ody-not to be taken seriously." Id.
45. The text of the ad parody as it appeared in Hustler is set out in Note, Falwell
v. Flynt, An Emerging Threat to Freedom of Speech, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 703, 716 n.76
(1987).
46. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1273. Falwell's invasion of privacy claim was brought under
section 8.01-40 of the Code of Virginia which provides a cause of action for damages
resulting from the unconsented use of an individual's name or likeness for the pur-
poses of trade or advertising. While Falwell's name and likeness were used in the par-
ody, the district court decided that the use was not for the purposes of trade as meant
by the statute. Id.
47. Accordingly, the jury determined that Falwell had suffered no damage to his
reputation. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1986) (denial of rehearing)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
48. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1273. The appellate court stated that intent could be satis-
fied by Flynt's testimony that he intended to cause Falwell emotional distress. It held
that the element of "outrageousness" was "quite obvious from the language in the par-
ody and in the fact that Flynt republished the parody after [the] lawsuit was filed." Id.
at 1276. Finally, the court also maintained that Falwell's testimony was sufficient to
establish that he suffered severe emotional distress and that the ad's publication proxi-
mately caused it. Falwell testified: "I think I have never been as angry as I was at that
moment .... My anger became a more rational and deep hurt ... I really felt like
weeping ... [I]f Larry Flynt had been nearby I might have physically reacted." Id. at
1276-77.
49. Id. at 1273. However, the jury did not return a verdict against Flynt Distribut-
ing Company. Id. In a related action, Hustler sued Falwell for copyright infringement.
The alleged infringement occurred when the Moral Majority, Inc. and Old Time Gos-
pel Hour reproduced and mailed hundreds of thousands of copies of the ad parody as
part of a solicitation campaign. The district court's ruling that the reproductions con-
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed
the lower court decision. The court agreed with the defendants' con-
tention that as a result of Falwell's status as a public figure they
were "entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they re-
ceived in Falwell's claim for libel."50 Nevertheless, the court refused
to literally apply the New York Times actual malice standard to the
emotional distress claim.51
The court of appeals stated that the New York Times holding fo-
cused on the constitutional import of the greater level of fault inher-
ent in the requirement of knowing and reckless conduct, and not on
the knowledge of the statement's falsity or the reckless disregard for
its truth.5 2 Therefore, it held that the New York Times standard was
met by the jury's determination pursuant to Virginia state law53 that
Flynt and Hustler had acted intentionally and recklessly.54 Further,
the appellate court rejected the argument that since the jury had
found the ad parody did not describe actual facts about Falwell, the
statement constituted an opinion which is afforded first amendment
protection.55 Finding this irrelevant, the appellate court asserted
that the issue was whether publication of the ad was an act "suffi-
ciently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress."56
Flynt and Hustler petitioned for a rehearing which the court de-
nied.57 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the
novel first amendment question of whether a public figure can re-
cover for emotional distress caused by the publication of a satire
stituted "fair use" was upheld. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986).
50. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1274.
51. Id. For a discussion of the actual malice standard set forth in New York
Times, see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
52. 1& at 1274-75.
53. To maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
Virginia, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct (1) is intentional or
reckless, (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality, (3) is caus-
ally connected with the plaintiff's emotional distress, and (4) caused severe emotional
distress. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
54. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1274-75.
55. 1& at 1275-76. See inkfra notes 98-109 and accompanying text for discussion of
satire as opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
56. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1276.
57. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986). Despite the denial for rehearing,
Judge Wilkinson wrote a very eloquent dissenting opinion in which he recognized the
constitutional gravity of the case. Id at 484-89 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
which many people would find offensive.58
The Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the fourth circuit. It
held that the first amendment prohibits public figures and public of-
ficials from recovering damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, as the result of the publication of a caricature, without estab-
lishing that the publication contains a false statement of fact which
was made with actual malice. 59
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
At the outset of the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist 6O indicated
the Court had found that a state's interest in protecting a public fig-
ure from emotional distress is insufficient to preclude "First Amend-
ment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended
to inflict emotional injury ... "61 The majority determined that a
public figure must prove actual malice, in addition to the elements
for emotional distress, in order to recover damages for the publica-
tion of a caricature.62 Accordingly, the Court has now placed a first
amendment limitation on the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and has reaffirmed its commitment to free speech and
the New York Times standard.
Recognizing that free speech is essential not only to individual lib-
erty but also to the "common quest for truth and the vitality of soci-
ety as a whole," 63 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the "free flow
of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" is at
the very core of the first amendment.64 For this reason, he main-
tained, the Supreme Court has been especially watchful to ensure
that individual expression remains unencumbered by government-
imposed sanctions.65
The Court observed that inevitably caustic speech about public
figures will be generated as a result of the vigorous political debate
58. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 879 (1988).
59. /d. at 882.
60. The Supreme Court was unanimous in its decision in this case. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia. Justice White authored a concurring opinion. The
newly-appointed Justice Kennedy had no role in the consideration of the case. Id, at
876.
61. Id, at 879.
62. I& at 882.
63. I& at 878 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)).
"[Tihe freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty--and
thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the
vitality of society as a whole." Id,
64. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 879 (1988).
65. Id.
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that the first amendment encourages;66 such expression, however, is
a necessary component of the free marketplace of ideas.6 7 Neverthe-
less, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that all speech about public
figures is not insulated from liability. The Court has repeatedly held
since New York Times that a public figure may recover for a defama-
tory falsehood that was made with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for its truth.68 This actual malice standard is said
to provide adequate "breathing space" for free expression by avoiding
the chilling effect on speech that would result if strict liability were
imposed for the assertion of false facts. At the same time, public
figures could still recover upon a showing that the falsehoods were
knowingly and recklessly made.69
The Court acknowledged that in prior cases it had ruled that ex-
pression motivated by malevolence and ill-will was provided with
first amendment protection.70 It further noted that while these mo-
tives are often dispositive in assessing liability in other tort areas,
"the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public
debate about public figures. '71 Moreover, the Court surmised that if
it held otherwise, "there [could] be little doubt that political cartoon-
ists and satirists would be subjected to damage awards without any
showing that their work falsely defamed its subject."72
The opinion then noted that, by their nature, satire and carica-
ture73 are acerbic and "often calculated to injure the feelings of the
subject of the portrayal." 74 Nonetheless, caricatures and satirical
66. Id, (citing Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring)); see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) (recognizing a public right to criticize); see
also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971) (political candidate open to
comment).
67. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 879 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
68. Id. at 880 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964)).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964)).
71. Id. at 881. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
72. Id, Such a result is repugnant to the first amendment. See infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
73. Caricature is defined as "the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a
person, literary style, etc., by exaggeration of features or mannerisms .... " Falwell,
108 S. Ct. at 881 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 275 (2d ed. 1979)). Chief Justice Rehnquist made the
following observations about such satire: "The art of the [political] cartoonist is often
not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided." Id. at 881.
74. Id In fact, Judge Wilkinson opined that:
cartoons have been important components of both public and political
discourse and their existence has enriched such debate.75
Admitting that the ad parody about Falwell bears only a minimal
affiliation with typical political cartoons,76 the majority steadfastly
refused to impose an "outrageousness" standard in the realm of pub-
lic and political discussion. 77 They believed such a standard would
have an "inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury
to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or per-
haps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression."7 8 Citing
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 7 9 and Street v. New York,80 the Court re-
affirmed its position that the offensiveness of some expression does
not justify stripping such speech of its constitutional protection;8 1
thus, the Hustler ad parody was entitled to full first amendment
protection.8 2
In conclusion, the majority reiterated its holding that public figures
and public officials cannot recover for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress allegedly suffered from the publication of a caricature
or a satirical work without also establishing that "the publication
contains a false statement of fact that was made ... with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether
or not it was true."8 3 This standard, according to the Court, is essen-
tial to provide ample "breathing space" for the liberties prescribed by
the first amendment.8 4
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice White, in his very brief concurrence, stated that the major-
ity's reliance on New York Times v. Sullivan8 5 was misplaced be-
cause the jury determined that no assertion of fact was made in the
The best political humor may be in bad taste. The cartoonist's nightmare may
be that the intended victim of all his insult and ridicule indeed fails to suffer
emotional distress, but instead finds the whole thing merely funny and calls
up the cartoonist, not to complain, but to ask for the original.
Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citing
Barnes, Lovebombing, The New Republic, Oct. 13, 1986, at 12).
75. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 881.
76. Id. See iVfra note 97 and accompanying text. It has been noted that "Hustler
magazine .. . is a singularly unappealing beneficiary of First Amendment values and
serves only to remind us of the costs a democracy must pay for its most precious privi-
lege of open political debate." Flynt, 805 F.2d at 484.
77. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 881-82.
78. MdL (citing NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)). See
infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
79. 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
80. 394 U.S. 576, 590-92 (1969).
81. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
82. See infra note 98.
83. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
84. 1I
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ad parody.86 However, Justice White agreed with the majority's rul-
ing that the first amendment precludes liability for publication of the
ad parody under an intentional infliction of emotional distress
theory.S7
V. IMPACT
The holding of the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
the New York Times standard and, for the first time, placed first
amendment limitations upon the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The Court sent a clear message to public figures and
officials that they will be unable to circumvent the substantial first
amendment protection given to media defendants in defamation suits
by merely recharacterizing their claims as one for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. By requiring a public figure plaintiff to es-
tablish actual malice as part of his emotional distress claim, the
Court recognized that when first amendment freedoms are involved
an objective standard is essential for determining liability based upon
speech. This significant decision gives rise to a number of concerns
involving the practical effects of the ruling, the likelihood of recovery
by public figures under an emotional distress theory, and the essen-
tially carte blanche authority of the media to say or write almost any-
thing about public figures.
A. Significance of an Objective Standard
The actual malice standard is a relatively objective criterion as
compared to the determination of "outrageousness."8 8 Since a public
figure would have to show actual malice to recover for emotional dis-
tress, both public figures and the media can operate with more cer-
tainty as to the actionability of a particular publication.8 9 If
outrageousness were the key requirement in establishing liability,
86. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 883.
87. Id
88. The actual malice test is, to a degree, a subjective evaluation. It focuses on the
defendant's knowledge regarding the truth of the statement; such a "statement must
be judged entirely on the basis of what the publisher intended it to mean." R. SACK,
supra note 10, at 212-13. However, it may be argued that an inquiry into the defend-
ant's attitude toward the truth of his statement is less likely to be as subjective as the
inquiry into "outrageousness"-which draws on the fact-finder's religious and moral
background, taste, etc. See generally Note, supra note 45, at 721-22.
89. A publisher is in a better position to know if he has knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth than to know if a particular portrayal is likely to be
deemed outrageous. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
the probable outcome of a potential claim would be shrouded in sub-
stantial ambiguity, a condition that would probably precipitate self-
censorship.90 This uncertainty would result because of the great de-
gree of subjectivity that would inevitably arise when a jury attempts
to decide if a publication is outrageous.9 1 The Court specifically
found that such subjectivity in the first amendment arena is unac-
ceptable. 9 2 Indeed, this statement is in full accord with prior hold-
ings which have held that speech is no less protected because it is
offensive or has an "adverse emotional impact on [its] audience."9 3
In light of the base and distasteful nature of the Hustler ad parody,
the Court is clearly upholding the principle that offensive speech is
still constitutionally protected. If the Court had held otherwise, it
would have placed certain cherished first amendment protections in
substantial jeopardy, as well as overturning its decisions that have
consistently afforded protection to offensive speech.9 4 Perhaps even
more unsettling is the fact that an outrageousness standard could
give rise to a sustainable cause of action against speech that is com-
pletely truthful. Thus, potential liability for offensive but truthful
speech would have a tremendous "chilling effect" on free speech and
90. One commentator suggests that an outrageousness standard would promote a
climate in which unpopular ideas could be punished:
Both public officials and public figures are likely to be identified with a partic-
ular viewpoint. Frequently the defendant will be on the other side of the is-
sue. Extreme and outrageous language is often associated with unpopular
ideas and positions. Accordingly, it will be very difficult for an appellate court
to determine whether it is the language or rather the accompanying message
that is the real object of the trier of fact's disapproval.
Note, supra note 45, at 721.
91. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988). "'Outrageousness'
in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it
which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views,
or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." Id. See supra note
88 and accompanying text.
92. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
93. Id. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909-12 (1982) (hold-
ing that speech by boycotters used to induce individuals not to patronize certain estab-
lishments protected by the first amendment); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745-46 (1978) (fact that father was offended by speech on radio not sufficient rea-
son for suppressing it); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1971) (first amendment
protected exclamation of "Fuck the Draft"); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 916 (1978). In Collin, the Nazi party was allowed to march in the
predominately Jewish community of Skokie, Illinois. Although many of the citizens
would likely suffer severe emotional distress, the court held that first amendment pro-
tection could not be made dependent on what a community finds offensive. 578 F.2d at
1205-06.
94. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (improperly displaying United
States flag with taped-on peace symbol held protected speech); Papish v. Board of Cu-
rators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (distribution of publication containing "indecent speech"
protected by the first amendment); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970) (advo-
cacy of unpopular idea protected); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (disrespect
for the flag by burning not an actionable offense); see also supra note 93 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 16: 97, 1988] Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
constitute an intolerable violation of the first amendment. 95
The Court acknowledged that the ad parody is a distant cousin to
political cartoons which provide necessary stimulation to healthy
public and political discourse.96 The determination that the ad par-
ody constituted satire or caricature was dispositive of the protection
given to the work and its publisher. The Court refused to condition
first amendment protection upon the perceived quality of the work
or the respectability of the publication involved.97 Therefore, it is the
categorization of a work as caricature and the status of the plaintiff
that determine whether the actual malice standard will be applied to
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
B. Practical Impact
As a practical result of the Falwell holding, if work can be roughly
defined as satire or caricature and it does not fall within one of the
unprotected categories,9 8 there is almost no way that a public figure
will be able to show actual malice. Caricature, by definition, involves
exaggeration and distortion. Reasonable people simply do not seek
factual information from satirical works.99 Therefore, it is anoma-
95. See supra notes 93, 94 and accompanying text; see also irnfra 'note 98. Unless
the speech is unprotected it is of value to public commentary and should be part of the
marketplace of ideas. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974). Creating fear of liability for protected speech would hinder open debate and fly
in the face of the first amendment objective of promoting such debate.
Judge Wilkinson recognized the value of satire to intellectual discourse. "Nothing
could be more threatening to the long tradition of satiric commentary than a cause of
action on the part of politicians for emotional distress. Satire is particularly relevant
to political debate because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks
hypocrisy." Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting).
96. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 882. For examples of satiric comment, see generally
Flynt, 805 F.2d at 487.
97. Id. To have done so, the Court would have been undercutting the objectivity
which is crucial in analyzing first amendment protection. Conditioning protection on
the quality of the satire or the reputation of the publication in which it appears would
involve unnecessary and inappropriate subjectivity, as would an "outrageousness"
standard.
98. In addition to defamatory communications, "fighting words" (words likely to
incite listeners to violence) and obscenity are types of speech that are unprotected
under the first amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
Unprotected categories of speech are those kinds of "utterances [that] are no essential
part of an exposition of ideas, and are of... slight social value as a step to truth." Id.
at 572.
99. While one who views a satirical skit, on Saturday Night Live for example, may
reasonably infer that there was a recent news event involving the individual being
lampooned, he would be unjustified in thinking that the skit was relaying actual facts
about the incident or the individual.
lous to allow recovery to public figures upon proof of the defendant's
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth when no actual
facts are being asserted0oo
In Gertz, the Court stated that under the first amendment false
ideas do not exist;10 ' only facts are subject to accusations of falsity.
However, satire is not intended to be taken literally, but rather, the
purpose of such work is to express ideas and to generate discussion
among its audience.102 Almost invariably, satire is an expression of
opinion10 3 or rhetorical hyperbole,1 0 4 both of which are protected
forms of speech. Thus, Justice White's contention that the applica-
tion of New York Times to the Hustler ad parody was misplaced ap-
pears to be valid.105
Even when a court does not consider the putative satirical work to
be opinion, it will not likely characterize the statements as factual as-
100. There must exist a false statement of fact before one can even attempt an "ac-
tual malice" showing. The Supreme Court has maintained that if a statement is not
one of fact, it could not contain a falsehood. Accordingly, the maker of a non-factual
statement could not possibly have knowledge of its falsity. See National Ass'n of Let-
ter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-84 (1974).
101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). "However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas." Id at 339-40.
102. While one purpose of satire and parody is to cause distress in the object of the
lampoon, this does not necessarily detract from the author's intention to express an
idea. "Humor is the idiom of the dissident and the critic because it appeals to the mind
as well as the emotions. Humor can expose human folly, establish perspective and of-
fer insight into human behavior." Note, supra note 45, at 724.
103. Expression protected by the first amendment includes even those "opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (publications concerning candidates for office accorded same pro-
tection under first amendment as those in office) (quoting Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,dissenting)).
104. The Supreme Court has consistently held that rhetorical hyperbole, state-
ments which cannot reasonably be interpreted as expressing facts, are accorded first
amendment protection and cannot provide the basis for a civil suit. Austin, 418 U.S. at
286-87 (1974). In Austin, the defendant labor union referred to a nonunion employee
as a "scab traitor," and as one "having 'rotten principles' and lacking in character." Id.
at 267, 283. The Court held this to be "rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative
expression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refused to join."
Id. at 286. See also Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970)
(newspaper's description of public figure's bargaining position as "blackmail" held to
be rhetorical hyperbole); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440-43 (10th Cir.
1982) (publication in which plaintiff was identifiable as subject of a fictional sexual ac-
count could not be reasonably understood as describing actual facts or actual events),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). The jury's finding in Falwell that the ad parody
could not reasonably be believed as presenting actual facts about Jerry Falwell indi-
cates that the ad parody was rhetorical hyperbole and thus protected.
105. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 883 (1988) (White, J., concur-
ring). The author suggests that while in the Falwell case the jury found no assertion
of fact, the Court invoked New York Times to establish its definitive stance on this
issue. Invoking the actual malice standard here will operate as a guide for future cases
when public figures seek damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress from
publications other than caricature or parody.
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sertions about the plaintiff. This is precisely what occurred in the
Falwell case. In such instances, where the speech is rhetorical hyper-
bole, proof of actual malice will be practically impossible as well.106
Interestingly, the more outrageous the statements, the less likely
they will be found to assert actual facts. This further demonstrates
the contradictory results an "outrageousness" standard would bring
about, when compared to an "actual malice" standard. It also under-
scores the threat an "outrageousness" standard would pose in the
area of the first amendment.l0 7
Regardless of whether one believes that satire constitutes opinion
or rhetorical hyperbole, the reality is that the Court's holding will
operate as an almost insurmountable obstacle for public figures at-
tempting to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress al-
legedly caused by the publication of a piece of satirical criticism. This
result is necessary in order that public commentary may thrive un-
fettered by fears of liability, particularly for true statements. 108 Rec-
ognizing that criticism of public figures contributes to the advocacy of
ideas, the protection of which is central to the first amendment, 0 9
the Court has ensured that satirists need not engage in unnecessary
self-censorship when making humorous attacks against public
figures.
C. The Carte Blanche Authority of the Media
Given the substantial difficulty a public figure plaintiff will have in
recovering for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress when satire is involved, one must question whether the media
can say or write almost anything about a public figure without fear of
legal reprisal. For the most part the media has such freedom, at least
when the satirical speech does not fall into one of the unprotected
categories. 110
However, it may be argued that recovery under defamation or in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress is inappropriate or unneces-
sary when the expression involved is satire or caricature. While the
paramount concern in the area of defamation is protecting an individ-
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
108. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 879; see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
109. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 879-80; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270-71, 273-76 (1964).
110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
ual's reputational interest,"1 it is unlikely that a public figure's repu-
tation will be measurably damaged by the publication of satire which
is rhetorical hyperbole and which could not reasonably be inter-
preted as presenting actual facts about the public figure. This is the
gravamen of the jury's finding in Falwell with respect to the defama-
tion claim.112 On the other hand, when the satire is determined to be
the opinion of the publisher, it is entirely possible that the public fig-
ure's reputation could be injured to some degree. l13 However, to pro-
mote open public debate of issues, the public figure's reputational
interest must necessarily be subordinated to the interest of injecting
the opinion into the marketplace of ideas.
In the area of emotional distress, where the plaintiff's emotional
well-being is of central importance,1 1 4 it is the plaintiff's status as a
public figure that makes him a target for satire and requires that he
be able to emotionally withstand such communications. In the world
of politics, "a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better pro-
tection than the law could ever be."115 Presumably, a prospective
public figure is aware of the inherent dangers which accompany pub-
lic life. Accordingly, he must be prepared for the possibility that un-
flattering statements concerning him will be published. Just as the
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan stated that a public offi-
cial's reputational interest must take a backseat to first amendment
speech, 1 6 so too must his interest in emotional tranquility.
This is not to suggest that a public figure is powerless to act when
he feels wronged by unfavorable words published about him. For ex-
ample, if the parody or satire is determined to be obscene, the pub-
lisher clearly can be prosecuted pursuant to the laws regulating
obscenity.11 7 Since such an action would be in the criminal arena,
however, the public figure would be unable to recover damages in a
subsequent civil suit absent a showing that the publication was done
with "actual malice." Accordingly, if the public figure can establish
that the statements were made with "actual malice," he may proceed
and attempt to prove either defamation or intentional infliction of
111. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
112. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. at 878.
113. Depending on the status of the opinion-maker, his credibility, and the size of
his audience, the public figure about whom he gives his opinion may suffer various
levels of reputational injury. For instance, if a highly regarded film critic gives an ac-
tor a scathing review, there may be some very real damage to the actor's professional
reputation.
114. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
115. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
117. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (statute regulating obscene depiction
of sexual conduct constitutional); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene ma-
terial not protected by first amendment).
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emotional distress. However, the reality is that this will prove ex-
tremely difficult when the speech can be colored as satire constitut-
ing either opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
D. Importance of the Decision in the Future
As the actual malice standard is technically inapposite to works of
derisive humor, the relevance of the Falwell holding is more likely to
be seen in suits involving supposed news reporting.ll8 It is highly
possible that public figures may attempt to claim emotional distress
or defamation in suits against tabloids or so-called "scandal sheets"
which have published allegedly false facts about that person. Since
public figures have recovered for libel against defendants such as the
National Enquireri19 by proving actual malice, an emotional distress
claim in such cases may be viable even under the new requirement.
Obviously, a crucial inquiry in proving actual malice would be
whether one could reasonably believe that a story in one of these
publications described actual facts about anyone or anything x20 At
the very least, public figures have a better chance of recovering for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against publications that
are supposedly reporting factual information. Therefore, emotional
distress suits brought by public figures against a more highly re-
garded news media may also be feasible in the future. After Falwell,
such actions may be successfully maintained if the public figure can
establish that publication was made with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth and can satisfy the remaining ele-
ments of intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 2 '
118. By their nature, news reports are intended to contain assertions of fact; there-
fore, they allow a plaintiff the opportunity to try to prove actual malice. However, edi-
torials are likely to be categorized as opinion, and editorial or political cartoons will
usually constitute opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. See generally Keller v. Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 717-18 (11th Cir. 1985).
119. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206
(1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). Actress Carol Burnett recovered for a
libelous story in the National Enquirer that reported her as being loud, violent, and
drunk in a Washington, D.C. restaurant. For a discussion of lawsuits against the Na-
tional Enquirer, see R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 100-17, 134-35 (1986).
120. Conceivably, some triers of fact would deem much of the contents in the Na-
tional Enquirer and similar publications to be rhetorical hyperbole-statements that
could not reasonably be construed as expressing actual facts about an individual. On
the other hand, Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983) demonstrates
that some stories in these publications will be interpreted as containing assertions of
fact. See supra note 117.
121. While the actual malice standard is a heavy enough burden to satisfy, the out-
rageousness requirement also encumbers the plaintiff with another weighty burden of
VI. CONCLUSION
The unanimous decision in Falwell reaffirms the Court's allegiance
to first amendment expression and acknowledges the importance of
unrestrained public discourse. Its message was clear: public figures
cannot circumvent the Constitution by recharacterizing a defamation
claim as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. By re-
quiring a public figure to show "actual malice" before he can prove a
claim for emotional distress allegedly caused by a satirical work, the
Court has acknowledged the value of satire in public debate and has
further reasserted its confidence in the "actual malice" standard as
being an effective instrument which serves to maintain free expres-
sion. Additionally, the Falwell holding has ameliorated any possibil-
ity that liability could result from truthful speech.
In reality, due to the characteristics of satire, it is doubtful that a
public figure will be able to prove "actual malice" in the publication
of such work. However, the import of this new requirement is likely
to be seen in future suits involving statements about public figures
that are factual assertions. Whether the Supreme Court will extend
the Falwell holding to forms of expression other than satire and cari-
cature remains to be seen. Nevertheless, since the Court believes
that the "actual malice" standard provides "sufficient breathing
space" to first amendment speech, such an extension can be safely
made without compromising the freedom of expression that the first
amendment was designed to protect.
JAMES R. LAGUZZA
proof. Even before the Falwell decision, defamation was the preferred theory to be
pled in suits against the media. See Mead, supra note 1, at 33-45 (1983). However, even
though the public figure may not be able to prove defamation (i.e., no reputational
damage), he may still have an alternative opportunity for recovery if he can prove ac-
tual malice and establish the other elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
